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1 Introduction
For half a century, growth and insurance have been among the star topics of
economic literature. But this stardom has been obtained ignoring each other,
in spite of numerous factual and theoretical arguments asserting strong links.
In this paper, we propose to fill this gap. To this eﬀect, we build a simple
theoretical model to insert microeconomically founded insurance within a
standard framework of optimal growth with prevention.
First, from a factual point of view, today, in the most developed countries,
insurance has become a determinant and inevitable variable in the individual
economic decisions, and, accordingly, it has a major macroeconomic weight.
In eﬀect, insurance expenditures, either private or public, represent a consid-
erable fraction of the national income. According to OECD (2004), unemploy-
ment rates in EU approximate 9% against 6% in the US, with non negligible
weights of unemployment benefits in the GDP (0.35% in average over the
past 20 years in US according to the Congress Budget Oﬃce and roughly
1.7% in EU according to European commission); health insurance represents
about 15% of GNP for US and between 7% and 10% for EU’s countries (e.g.,
Colombo and Tapay, 2004 ; Huber, 1999). Moreover, the Insurance Infor-
mation Institute (2005) estimates that US insurance industry accounts for
2,3 million jobs in 2004 and that over the last ten years, employment in the
insurance industry amounts to 2,1% of the total employment. In 2004, its net
income after taxes, at about 38,7$ billion, was at the highest level since 1998.
Hence, insurance industry generates a significant fraction of gross domestic
product. In addition, by alleviating subscribers’ losses induced by various
covered risks (unemployment, illness, casualties, etc), it sustains revenues,
hence consumption and savings. It is even ascertained that the risk coverage
has an influence on the macroeconomic amount of damages (e.g., Danzon
and Pauly1, 2002). As to the estimation of the statistical relation between
economic growth and the development of the insurance industry, the notable
study of OECD countries by Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) shows that the in-
surance industry Granger causes economic growth for some countries and the
reverse is significant for others. The authors conclude that these diﬀerences
across countries are probably due to ”the nature of the cultural, regulatory,
and legal environment [...] and the moral hazard eﬀect of insurance”.
Second, on theoretical grounds, individuals use insurance —either on a vol-
untary or compulsory basis— to face risk. In an intertemporal perspective, the
1The authors attribute ”between one-fourth and one-half of the total growth in drug
spending” to insurance coverage shifts over the 1990s in US.
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(given) insurance coverage influences their will to smooth their intertemporal
consumption paths and their prevention behavior2. By aggregation eﬀect, on
the macroeconomic side, insurance induces specific capital accumulation and
growth rate, and conversely, the growth of income changes the individual
trade-oﬀs relative to risk. At last, it is shown that the governments can play
an improving role in this relationship by controlling public insurance schemes
and legislation3.
As mentioned above, the literature seems to have neglected to study
this ”natural” link between growth and idiosyncrasic risk insurance. These
two fields of economic research have developed separately. Earlier microeco-
nomic research on insurance in an intertemporal framework divides in two
trends: one without moral hazard (multi-period -Drèze and Modigliani, 1972
or Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1984- or continuous time life cycle -Somerville,
2004 or Moore and Young, 2005- or continuous time infinite horizon -Bryis,
1986 or Gollier, 1994-), the other with moral hazard (Job search and optimal
unemployment insurance -Eherenberg and Oaxaca, 1976 or Jovanovic, 1979
or Gruber, 1997 or Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997- or dynamic contracts
with repeated games -Radner, 1985). The first trend aims to assess how
the saving behaviors are modified in a context of partial insurance coverage.
The authors find that insurance and intertemporal consumption are discon-
nected if full insurance is the rule and describe specific dynamics with ad hoc
incomplete insurance. For the second trend, the main objective is to iden-
tify optimal dynamic contracts. But, both these microeconomic approaches
rely on exogenous intertemporal prices, which elicits any connection between
insurance and macroeconomic dynamics. Instead, in a macroeconomic in-
tertemporal framework, prevention eﬀort and savings are both influenced
by expectations of intertemporal prices which are, in turn, explained by the
capital accumulation and the individual risk levels.
The macroeconomic literature on this topic is not abundant, to say the
least, despite notable exceptions. As an illustration, the macroeconomics
with idiosyncratic shocks and moral hazard (for example, Banerjee and New-
man, 1993 and 1994; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Ghatak et al., 2001), by as-
suming the agents to be risk-neutral, generally avoids to deal with optimal
demand for insurance. Other analyses have been developed where insur-
ance plays a passive role with an ad hoc hypothesis of incomplete insurance
2For example, people will try to adopt diets which minimize the risk of coronarian
disease, or systematically vaccinate their children or limit their smoking habit, or search
jobs in a larger basin of employment.
3Theoretical arguments in favor of public insurance or public regulation can be found
in Arrow (1963), Akerlof (1970) or Pauly (1974).
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which is mainly a technical assumption to modelize the dynamics of wealth
inequality. The dynamic general equilibrium is generally obtained by numer-
ical methods (e.g. Koeniger, 2002). One notable exception is Young (2004)
who goes further and presents an interesting study on optimal insurance with
production and private savings. Although in an allusive manner, he points
to the question of the link between optimal growth and the social planner’s
choice of replacement ratio. Due to incentive consideration, he obtains long-
run optimality when the latter is nil. Another notable exception is Blanchard
(1985) who proposes generalizations in dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work of the model of Yaari (1965) with full life insurance in a life-cycle model
with uncertain lifespan.
Formally, the paper develops a growth model with insurance and moral
hazard. The framework is that of a benevolent planner which maximizes the
intertemporal average welfare of agents. The agents have the same stucture
of time and risk preferences, their life horizon is one period4 and they are sub-
mitted to individual and endogenous stochastic damages. Time is continuous
and each period’s length is supposed to be of measure zero. The key factor
of risk is the non observable discrete prevention eﬀort of the agent which
the planner wants to monitor via the insurance coverage of consumption
loss. To determine the optimal trajectory of the economy, we use traditional
optimal control theory. We describe the underpinnnings of the dynamics.
First, we derive the first order conditions then we characterize the optimal
path. We get a usual incentive constraint and a modified Euler condition
of intertemporal consumption trade-oﬀ. In this paper, income eﬀects on the
optimal insurance contract are contemplated in a dynamic perspective. An
obvious link exists between prevention and the development level. A priori,
the dynamic characteristic of damage should determine the optimal insur-
ance coverage degree. When the induced loss is weakly dependent on the
economic growth, the latter may reduce the welfare benefit of prevention
(diﬀerence between the utilities obtained with and without damage), which
depends on the risk aversion parameter. In such a case, the prevention eﬀort
should decrease with economic development. In other configurations where
the cost of damage depends strongly on wealth, the prevention eﬀort can fol-
low more complex dynamics. The optimal insurance and growth path should
depend mainly on the characteristics of risk (notably value of damage, cost
of prevention) and the public discount rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the economy
4This assumption avoids to deal with issue about dynamic insurance penalties in case
of repeated sinisters (see Radner, 1985).
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and determines the economic tradeoﬀs for both the planner and the agents.
Section three characterizes the long-run equilibrium, the global dynamics and
the evolution of insurance coverage with time. Three types of trajectories
are identified: first, a simple dynamics with permanent partial insurance
or full insurance, second, one with regime switching converging to a steady
state with full or partial insurance and, finally, one with mixed equilibrium.
Section four concludes.
2 The model
We consider people living only one period and a planner with an infinite
horizon of life. To simplify the identification of dynamic time path, we will
assume time to be continuous (length of each period tends to zero) as in the
standard model of Ramsey (1928).
2.1 The agents
People are risk averse. Their objective is to maximise their ex ante ex-
pected welfare. Each agent is given by the planner an endowment of goods
to consume. This endowment depends on an i.i.d. perfectly observable state
of nature experienced by the agent. The only choice left to anyone is his
prevention eﬀort, denoted hereafter e. The latter is assumed to take only
two values, e = 0 (no prevention) or e = 1 (full prevention). Each agent
uses a personal capital stock k (allocated by the planner) in his productive
activity. The latter is risky: for a per capita stock k, the net production
may be either f (k) = f (k) , in case of absence of damage with probability
1 − p (e) , or f (k) < f (k) with f (0) = 0, in case of damage with proba-
bility p (e). We denote μ (k) = f (k) − f (k) the production loss, i.e. the
financial cost of damage. μ (0) is not necessary nil (for example in case of
amount of damage independant of the level of capital). By construction, we
have: p (0) = p0 > p (1) = p1. f and f have usual properties of decreasing
returns production technologies: f
0
> 0, f 0 > 0 and f
00
< 0, f 00 < 0. Each
agent chooses his individual eﬀort level (ex ante) before knowing his actual
production level (ex post) and implicitely, his consumption endowment.
The instantaneous level of welfare is measured by the following additively
separable utility function: v (c˜, e) = u (c˜)− γ · e where u is the level of utility
induced by stochastic consumption c˜, such that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0 and where
γ is the unit welfare cost of prevention eﬀort.
The agent is VNM and maximizes his expected welfare. For a stochastic
consumption bundle allocated by the planner and denoted (c; c) , where c
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(resp. c) is the level of consumption in case of damage (resp. no damage), he
chooses prevention if and only if his benefit in terms of anticipated welfare
is greater than his cost of prevention, i.e. when his individual incentive
constraint is checked:
(p0 − p1) · (u (c)− u (c)) > γ. (1)
2.2 The social planner
2.2.1 The static program: a standard optimal insurance problem
with moral hazard
The social planner’s information about the individual choices of prevention
is imperfect since the individual eﬀorts of prevention are not observable.
Instead, the state of nature (high vs low production level) is perfectly ob-
servable. This configuration is the standard optimal insurance with moral
hazard as described in the seminal paper of Arnott and Stiglitz (1990).
Her insurance policy relies on the representative agent’s microeconomic
tradeoﬀs and she applies the rule ”bounty for lucky and penance for un-
lucky”. The planner seeks to maximize the agents’ anticipated welfare. To
induce people to engage in greater prevention eﬀort, she can use an imperfect
insurance coverage in case of damage. We denote by ε = c − c the gap in
consumption inflicted by the planner when damage occurs.
Hereafter, we will denote y = f (k)−δ ·k− k˙ the potential average income
allocated to agents before considering the cost of damages. It is defined as the
diﬀerence between their production f (k) net of the depreciation of capital
(at rate δ) and the capital accumulation choice (k˙). Moreover, the expected
consumption for prevention eﬀort e = 0 or 1 writes: c = y − pe · μ (k), with
μ (k) being the production loss f − f as defined earlier.
By using the individual choice rule and the resource constraint, the plan-
ner can encourage people to adopt prevention iﬀ :
h (c, ε) = (p0 − p1) · (u (c+ p1 · ε)− u (c− (1− p1) · ε)) ≥ γ, (2)
and welfare level with prevention will be maximized when the equality above
is verified. Arnott-Stiglitz (1990) find a similar condition. The latter leads
to a minimal cost incentive penalty rule which the existence is guaranteed
according to the following proposition.
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[P1] Existence of an incentive penalty rule:
For γ < (p0 − p1)
h
u
³
c
1−p1
´
− u (0)
i
, there exists a function ε (c) such
that h (c, ε) = γ is verified with ε0 > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
We will denote Ve the indirect utility levels of consumption associated to
the eﬀort level e such that:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
For e = 1, V1 (c) = E (u (c˜)) = p1 · u (c) + (1− p1) · u (c)
with
½
c = c+ p1 · ε (c)
c = c− (1− p1) · ε (c) ,
For e = 0, V0 (c) = u (c) .
The social planner’s control variable, penalty ε, increases with the average
level of consumption because the marginal disutility induced by uncertainty
is decreasing with wealth. We have to stress that prevention is not seeked
per se. The planner will opt for prevention only if it leads to a net positive
welfare benefit. Formally, the condition writes at each period:
g (y, μ) = V1 (y − p1 · μ)− V0 (y − p0 · μ) ≥ γ. (3)
This condition will be called hereafter the "positive welfare benefit condition"
denoted PWBC.
2.2.2 The dynamic program
The choice of optimal insurance is contingent to the optimal choice of capital
accumulation and vice versa: knowing the optimal value of y and the stock
of capital k, the planner infers the corresponding level of optimal insurance;
in turn, the adopted level of prevention determines the type of dynamics.
This two-step maximization procedure is then equivalent to the one-step
maximization of the whole program.
Time is assumed to be continuous. We call ρ the planner’s time discount-
ing value. The social planner’s intertemporal program then writes:
(
max
{k(t),y(t)}
R +∞
0
exp (−ρt) · £Ve ¡y (t)− pe(t)μ (k (t))¢− γ · e (t)¤ dt
s.t. k˙ (t) = f (k (t))− δ · k (t)− y (t) (λ (t))
, (4)
with e = 1 if g (y, μ (k)) ≥ γ and e = 0 otherwise. λ (t) denotes the costate
variable for capital.
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Let us form the current value Hamiltonian, omitting time t:
He = Ve (y − pe · μ (k))−γ · e+ ψ (f (k)− δ · k − y) , (5)
with ψ (t) = λ (t) · exp (ρt) the current value costate variable of the planner’s
program.
The first order conditions give:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
y : ∂He∂y = Vy − ψ = 0
k :
·
ψ = −∂He∂k + ρ · ψ = −Vk − ψ · (f 0 (k)− δ) + ρ · ψ
λ : k˙ = f (k)− δ · k − y
(6)
since
·
ψ = ρ · exp (ρt) · λ+ exp (ρt) · λ˙ and λ˙ = −∂He∂k .
When the level of prevention e is stationary, the intertemporal program
of maximization is standard. So the usual transversality condition obtains.
The first two equations of the FOC system rewrite as:( ·
ψ = Vyy · y˙ + Vyk · k˙
·
ψ = −Vk − ψ · (f 0 (k)− δ − ρ)
. (7)
By using properties of V (c), we have Vy = V 0 (c) , Vk = −p ·μ0 (k) ·Vy, Vyy =
V 00 (c), Vyk = −p·μ0 (k)·V 00 (c) and Vy/Vyy = u0(c+p1ε0(c))(1+p1ε0(c))u00(c+p1ε0(c)) if g (y, μ (k))
≥ γ or Vy/Vyy = u
0(c)
u00(c) if g (y, μ (k)) < γ. (7) then leads to:
⎧
⎨
⎩
·
ψ = Vyy ·
h
y˙ − pμ0 (k) k˙
i
·
ψ = −Vy · [f 0 (k)− pμ0 (k)− δ − ρ]
. (8)
Finally, we find:(
y˙ = − VyVyy (f
0 (k)− pμ0 (k)− (δ + ρ)) + p · μ0 (k) · k˙
k˙ = f (k)− δ · k − y . (9)
For e given, the expected consumption writes c = y−pe ·μ (k) . Also, we have
·
c = y˙ − p · μ0 (k) · k˙ and the FODE system characterizes in the consumption
and capital accumulation plane as follows:( ·
c = C (c, k) = − VyVyy (c) · (f 0e (k)− (δ + ρ))
k˙ = K (c, k) = fe (k)− δ · k − c
(10)
where fe (k) = f (k)− pe · μ (k) is the expected production level for given e.
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3 Study of the dynamics
3.1 Preliminary remark relative to the wealth eﬀect
on the incentive constraint
We now turn to the description of the dynamics which is similar to the stan-
dard optimal growth approach. The particularity here is that two potential
dynamics can emerge. They depend on the value of the average income allo-
cated to agents (y) and the cost of damage (μ). Let us stress that while they
are given in the standard microeconomic approach, both variables obviously
change over time in a macroeconomic dynamics approach, hence modifying
the PWBC. This leads us to determine the two following subsets contingent
to e in the (y, k) plane:
Ωe=1 (resp. 0) = {y ∈ Dk and k ∈ [0; kmax] |PWBC is (resp. not) checked} ,
where kmax is the stationary specific value of capital per head when the
golden rule with prevention prevails (ρ = 0) i.e. f 01 (kmax) = δ and for a
given k, the domain of definition of the function g (y, μ) is the interval Dk =
[ymin (μ (k)) ; ymax (k)] with ymin = p0·μ and ymax (k) = f (k) + (1− δ) k.
To this eﬀect, we need to identify a locus where agents are indiﬀerent
between prevention and no prevention. On the figures below, this frontier
will be denoted WB = 0 for ”zero welfare benefit”. Its precise shape and
position depend both on μ and y, with contradictory wealth eﬀects. In a
principal-agent moral hazard setting, Mookherjee (1997) evidences that an
increase in wealth has two opposing eﬀects on the optimal eﬀort level: an
incentive eﬀect (cf. ε0 > 0, i.e. stronger punishments) and a trade-oﬀ eﬀect
in terms of eﬀort (the marginal disutility of loss decreases with respect to the
agent’s prevention cost). That means that the relationship between μ and y
is complex.
Hereafter, for sake of simplicity, we will assume conditions on utility func-
tion to get a clearcut partition of these two continuous subsets in the plane
of planner’s choice variables (k, y) . The frontier WB = 0 is expressed by an
increasing separating relation between y and μ : yt (μ) . This function gives
the threshold value of y inducing a switch between e = 1 and e = 0. This
increasing relation expresses formally the intuition that the threshold of gross
income allocated to consumption and risk (y) will be higher the greater the
financial cost of damage. The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of such a relation.
[P2] SC for the existence of an increasing separating relation y =
yt (μ). Suﬃcient conditions for g (y, μ) = γ and ∂y∂μ > 0 are:
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[C1] V1 (p0μ)− γ > V0 (0) ;
[C2] V1 (+∞)− γ < V0 (+∞) ;
[C3] (1 + p1 · ε0) · u0(y−p1·μ+p1·ε)u0(y−p0·μ) < 1 .
Proof: See Appendix.
The shape of yt (μ) depends on both real and psychological components.
The former is the direct influence of capital accumulation (k) on the damage
cost (μ). The latter lies with the consumers’ psychological cost of prevention
(γ).
The dependency of μ on the capital accumulation determines the slope
of the curve in the plane (k, y) . The stronger the correlation of μ with k, the
greater the slope of yt (μ).
If μ is weakly correlated to k, the profile of this curve will be relatively
flat. On contrary, if μ is strongly correlated to k, the curve will show an
important slope. In our graphical representations, it will be assumed μ0 ≥ 0.
Concerning the psychological cost of prevention, an increase in γ shifts
the curve downward whenever [P2] applies: we remark first that ∂ε∂γ > 0 ;
second, we have ∂V1∂γ = −p1 (1− p1)
∂ε
∂γ (u
0 (c)− u0 (c¯)) − 1 < 0. If [P2] ap-
plies, we deduce that:
³
∂y
∂γ
´
g(y,μ)=γ
< 0. However, the level of γ influences
also the slope of the WB = 0 curve but the global eﬀect is not clear. It
depends crucially on the explicit utility function chosen. Thereafter, for sake
of simplicity, we will assume this ”slope eﬀect” is minor.
These two components allow to draw the WB = 0 curve. From the
properties above, we can use γ as a parameter to control the reference level (in
terms of y) of the curve and the slope of the function μ (k) plays an important
role on ∂yt∂k . By modifying the relative importance of these components, it
is possible to characterize diﬀerent configurations of the trajectories followed
by the economy.
3.2 Long run equilibrium
For e given, the two loci of stationarity c˙ = 0 (cce (k) hereafter) —or equiva-
lently y˙ = 0 (yye (k) hereafter)— and k˙ = 0 (kke (k) hereafter) satisfy respec-
tively: f 0e (k)− (δ + ρ) = 0 and c = fe (k)− δ · k. On the figures thereafter,
the loci y˙ = 0 are reported only for values of e respecting the PWBC. Let us
stress, that the other loci k˙ = 0 is the same for both values of e in the plane
(k, y) and has a positive intercept for k = 0 if we assume μ (0) > 0 which is
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the case on the figures. We will denote hereafter xˆe the value taken by any
variable x at the steady state e. The existence and unicity of the steady state
for e given is established below (with PWBC not necessary checked).
[P3] Existence and unicity of the steady state for e given:
For each value of prevention eﬀort, there exists only one steady state
³
kˆe, yˆe
´
:(
kˆe = f 0−1e (δ + ρ)
yˆe = f
³
kˆe
´
− δ · kˆe. .
Proof: See Appendix.
These two steady states are contingent to the satisfaction of the PWBC.
In the long run (LR), four possibilities must be contemplated:
- LR1: if g (yˆ1, μˆ1) > γ and g (yˆ0, μˆ0) > γ, the steady state with prevention
obtains. It is denoted E1 on Fig. 1a, Fig. 2a, Fig. 2b, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
- LR2: if g (yˆ0, μˆ0) < γ and g (yˆ1, μˆ1) < γ, the steady state without
prevention obtains. It is denoted E0 on Fig. 1a, Fig. 2a, Fig. 2b, Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4.
- LR3: if g (yˆ1, μˆ1) > γ and g (yˆ0, μˆ0) < γ, the two previous equilibria are
reachable. The planner must then compare the two welfare paths and choose
the ”best” one. This configuration is illustrated by Fig. 2c.
- LR4: if g (yˆ1, μˆ1) < γ and g (yˆ0, μˆ0) > γ, none of the two previous
equilibria respects the PWBC. We show in the next proposition that there
exists an ”intermediate” equilibrium which is a particular combination of the
latter and which can be interpreted as a "randomized" insurance contract.
The ”intermediate” equilibrium corresponding to this situation is denoted
E01 on Fig. 1b. This steady state is reachable in finite time contrarily to
the two previous cases. For this reason, there is no need to derive the local
stability condition. This steady state expresses a very particular situation
where the planner arbitrarily splits the population in two groups by oﬀering
randomly two distinct menus in terms of insurance contracts and capital
allocation. 1−q (resp. q) denotes the proportion of agents who opt for (resp.
no) prevention. The average eﬀort in the population is eˆ = (1− q)×1+q×0 =
1− q.
[P4] Existence of an ”intermediate” equilibrium
³
kˆ01, yˆ01
´
:
If g (yˆ1, μˆ1) < γ and g (yˆ0, μˆ0) < γ, there exists a unique scalar 0 < q < 1
s.t.:
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p1 · u (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1 − (1− p1) · ε (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1))
+ (1− p1) · u (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1 + p1 · ε (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1))
= u (yˆ01 − p0μˆ0) + γ,
with yˆ01 = q · yˆ0 + (1− q) · yˆ1.
Proof: See Appendix.
3.3 Local stability
In the neighborhood of the two ”pure” steady states, the dynamics can be
linearized as usual in the following way:
⎧
⎨
⎩
c˙ = Cc · (c− cˆ) + Ck ·
³
k − kˆ
´
k˙ = Kc · (c− cˆ) +Kk ·
³
k − kˆ
´ . (11)
As seen before,
⎧
⎨
⎩
C
³
cˆe, kˆe
´
= − VyVyy (cˆe) ·
³
f 0e
³
kˆe
´
− (δ + ρ)
´
K
³
cˆe, kˆe
´
= fe
³
kˆe
´
− δ · kˆe − cˆe
, then we have:
Cc = 0, Ck = − VyVyy (cˆe) ·
³
f 00e
³
kˆe
´´
, Kc = −1 and Kk = ρ. The characteristic
equation of our dynamic system writes:
¯¯¯¯
¯ −λ − VyVyy (cˆe) ·
³
f 00e
³
kˆe
´´
−1 ρ− λ
¯¯¯¯
¯ = λ2 − ρλ− VyVyy (cˆe) ·
³
f 00e
³
kˆe
´´
= 0. (12)
The product of the two roots is equal to − VyVyy (cˆe) · f 00e
³
kˆe
´
. This term is
negative. Hence, there will be one positive and one negative real root and,
the same properties of saddle point as in a standard Ramsey problem obtain.
As for the ”intermediate” steady state equilibrium, there is no standard
local stability properties. Instead, the planner controls the trajectory so that
the mixed equilibrium be reachable. At this equilibrium, she chooses a par-
ticular share q such that the stability is obtained both for consumption and
capital accumulation.
3.4 Global dynamics and regime switching
Out of the neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium, the transitory dy-
namics cannot be sketched easily. However, in our case, the dynamic system
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is relatively simple (cf. functions C (c, k) and K (c, k)), so that we can de-
scribe the global dynamics in a good qualitative way (cf. Léonard and Van
Long, 1992, p. 101). This heuristic resolution is endorsed by Gandolfo (1998,
p. 407-408) who stresses that, as an alternative, ”we may always try a numer-
ical integration of the system (computers will do the job), but this possibility
is not of great help to economic theorist. In economic theory one seeks gen-
eral answers, independant of numerical analyses [...]”. From a qualitative
view point, a discussion on the value -high or low- of μ (k) or γ allows to
distinguish diﬀerent and relevant configurations of the WB = 0 curve. In
all figures below, the stable branche of the diﬀerent transitory dynamics is
represented by a dashed upward-sloping curve. We distinguish between four
situations :
- Weak correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 weak) and relatively weak value of γ
(case 1);
- Strong correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 strong) and relatively strong value of
γ (case 2);
- Strong correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 strong) and relatively weak value of
γ (case 3);
- Weak correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 weak) and relatively strong value of γ
(case 4).
• Case 1: Weak correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 weak) and relatively weak
value of γ.
That means in this configuration that: yt (kmax) < kk (kmax) and for ini-
tial value k (0) , yt (k (0)) > kk (k (0)) . If the planner is too impatient, she
opts for the unique trajectory converging to the saddle point with preven-
tion (E1). We know from the properties of the system that this trajectory
describes a positive relation between capital and consumption. This trajec-
tory is represented on Fig. 1a. That means that the economy will always be
under partial insurance regime.
If the planner is suﬃciently patient, her solution is straightforward when
the initial value of capital per head (k (0)) and its associated value (y (0))
on the converging (to E0) trajectory are located in the region of the plane
compatible with the optimal choice of zero prevention. That means that the
economy will always be under full insurance regime. Otherwise, the planner
operates backward: knowing the end of the trajectory, she comes back until
the point (krs, crs0 ) where she is indiﬀerent between full and zero prevention in
terms of welfare. At this point, she can reach another point (krs, crs1 ) giving
equivalent welfare (she imposes a ”regime switching”, see Fig. 1a), and go
back along the unique (unstable) trajectory reaching this same point until
13
the initial condition k (0) . That means that the economy will experience a
partial insurance regime in finite time. In our illustrations, we draw paths
with at most one regime switching. However, no condition exists to garantee
the unicity of regime switching. Multi-regime switchings are realistic. That
depends on the trajectory profiles as well as the WB = 0 curve.
If the planner is moderatly patient (intermediate case), knowing the long
run equilibrium with mixed strategy, she chooses the (unstable) trajectory
with prevention reaching this point in finite time. Then, she immediately
adopts a strategy inducing a stable consumption and capital accumulation
which relies on a mixed profile of prevention eﬀort as described above. Know-
ing this trajectory, she tracks backward to the initial condition k (0) .
• Case 2: Strong correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 strong) and relatively strong
value of γ.
That means in this configuration that: yt (kmax) > kk (kmax) and (even-
tually) for initial value k0, yt (0) < kk (0) . The results are the opposite of the
previous ones. When suﬃciently patient, the planner aims to reach a high
capital accumulation with prevention (with eventual ”regime switching”, see
Fig. 2a or Fig. 2b) while, when too impatient, she will lead the economy
towards a full insurance (hence, zero prevention) equilibrium. With respect
to case 1, the risk level crucially depends on the financial cost of damage,
μ (k). The more the latter is linked to the level of economic development,
the more likely the marginal benefit of prevention increases. The condition
yt (kmax) > kk (kmax) suggests suﬃciently high levels of development in the
long run.
• Case 3: Strong correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 strong) and relatively weak
value of γ.
That means in this configuration that: yt (k) > kk (k) ∀k ≤ kmax. Finan-
cial cost of risk is always high enough and psychological cost of prevention
is always low enough to guarantee the dominance of the equilibrium with
prevention and partial insurance (see Fig. 3).
• Case 4: Weak correlation of μ w.r.t k (μ0 strong) and relatively strong
value of γ.
That means in this configuration that: yt (k) < kk (k) ∀k ≤ kmax. The
opposite of previous case prevails. Financial cost of risk is always low enough
and psychological cost of prevention is always high enough to guarantee the
dominance of the equilibrium without prevention and full insurance (see Fig.
4).
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ky
E0
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
e = 1
dy=0 (e=1)
impatient 
economy
dy=0 (e=0)
patient 
economy
E1 Regime switching
e = 0
Fig. 1a — Weak correlation of μ w.r.t. k and relatively weak value of γ.
k
y
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
e = 0
dy=0 (e=0) dy=0 (e=1)
E01
dy=0 (0<e<1)
e = 1
Fig. 1b — Case 1 with intermediate long run equilibrium.
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ky
E1
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
e = 0
dy=0 (e=0)
impatient 
economy
dy=0 (e=1)
patient 
economy
E0
Regime switching
e = 1
Fig. 2a — Strong correlation of μ w.r.t. k and relatively strong value of γ:
(unicity of the long run equilibrium).
k
y
E1
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
e = 0
dy=0 (e=0)
impatient 
economy
dy=0 (e=1)
patient 
economy
E0
Regime switching
e = 1
Fig. 2b — Other configuration showing ”no prevention to prevention”
trajectory.
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ky
E1
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
e = 0
dy=0 (e=0) dy=0 (e=1)
E0
Regime switching
e = 1
Fig. 2c — Case 2 with two long run equilibria
k
y
E1
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
 e = 0
dy=0 (e=1)
impatient 
economy
dy=0 (e=1)
patient 
economy
E1
 e = 1
Fig. 3 — Strong correlation of μ w.r.t. k and relatively weak value of γ.
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ky
E0
WB = 0
dk=0 (e=0 or e=1)
 e = 0
dy=0 (e=0)
impatient 
economy
dy=0 (e=0)
patient 
economy
E0
 e = 1
Fig. 4 — Weak correlation w.r.t. k and relatively strong value of γ.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper aims at proposing a very simple way to link insurance and eco-
nomic growth in a Ramsey framework, hoping to contribute to fill strange
vacuum in the literature on this topic. We identify and categorize not so
trivial trajectories.
Globally, what determines the optimal trajectory of economy is the com-
bined eﬀect of the social net benefit of prevention eﬀort and the public dis-
count rate. The lower the latter and the higher the former, the more likely
the economy will reach a full prevention with partial insurance steady state.
The converse prevails.
We have evidenced three main configurations for the optimal dynamics
with insurance:
- converging dynamics with permanent partial insurance, or inversely with
full insurance;
- finite time dynamics with partial insurance then permanent full insur-
ance regime, or inversely full insurance then permanent partial insurance;
- dynamics with partial insurance reaching (in finite time) a particular
steady state with mixed insurance schemes (full for some and partial for the
others) induced by the heterogeneity of both prevention choice and consump-
tion allocation.
In the particular case where the social net benefit of prevention is not
suﬃciently high in the long run, our results show impatience puts brakes on
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economic development and the society may never attain a suﬃcient wealth
level to abandon prevention. That could oﬀer one possible explanation ceteris
paribus of the fact that some societies (the richest) can loose their prevention
eﬀort while others (the poorest) stick to it. Moreover, these results could
be seen as an alternative theoritical interpretation of the Kuznets’ curve
(1955). Insurance is a good means to reduce inequality. In our framework,
for incentive reasons, growth can induce an increase in the consumption gap
deriving from risk. But, when developement is suﬃcient, the planner will
switch to full insurance and will eliminate inequality in consumption due to
hazard.
These results, notably the global properties of our dynamics, are obtained
in a heuristic way. A useful prolongation of this work will consist in compu-
tational simulation to explore real solutions.
Appendix
[P1] Proof of the existence of an incentive penalty rule:
We have hc = (p0 − p1) · (u0 (c)− u0 (c)) < 0 and hε = (p0 − p1) · ((1− p1) ·
u0 (c) + p1 · u0 (c)) > 0. We can deduce that h (c, ε) = γ admits only one
solution, and we have ∂ε∂c = −
hc
hε
> 0. QED.
[P2] Proof of the existence of SC for an increasing separating rela-
tion:
When the conditions V1 (p0μ)− γ > V0 (0) [C1] and V1 (+∞)− γ < V0 (+∞)
[C2] are checked, the continuity of function g implies that there exist one
or several solutions y for given μ such that g (y, μ) = γ. If g (y, μ) for given
μ is monotonic, there exists a unique solution y (μ). By construction, we
have ∂g∂y = V
0
1 − V 00 . ∂g∂y < 0 iﬀ 1 − (1 + p1 · ε0) · u
0(y−p1·μ+p1·ε)
u0(y−p0·μ) > 0 [C3]. As
∂g
∂μ = −p1 · ∂g∂y + (p0 − p1) · u0 (y − p1 · μ) , we deduce that if ∂g∂y < 0, then
∂g
∂μ > 0. [C3] is then a suﬃcient condition for
³
∂y
∂μ
´
g(y,μ)=γ
= − ∂g∂μ/
∂g
∂y > 0.
QED.
[P3] Proof of the existence and unicity of the steady state for e
given:
By construction f 00e < 0 then f 0e is monotonically decreasing. There exists a
solution kˆe s.t. kˆe = f 0−1e (δ + ρ) . QED.
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[P4] Proof of the existence of an ”intermediate” equilibrium (kˆ01
, yˆ01): We search a stationary solution such that:
G (q) = p1 · u (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1 − (1− p1) · ε (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1))
+ (1− p1) · u (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1 + p1 · ε (yˆ01 − p1μˆ1))
−u (yˆ01 − p0μˆ0)− γ
= 0
with yˆ01 (q) = q · yˆ0 + (1− q) · yˆ1
We have G (0) > γ and G (1) < γ with:
G0 (q) = (yˆ1 − yˆ0) ·
µ
u0 (yˆ01 − p0μˆ0)− u0 (yˆ1 − p0μˆ1)−
∂g (yˆ1, μˆ1)
∂y
¶
> 0,
since yˆ01−p0μˆ0 < yˆ1−p0μˆ1 and ∂g(yˆ1,μˆ1)∂y < 0. This function being continuous
between [0, 1] , there exists necessarily only one scalar q s.t. G (q) = γ. QED.
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